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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The 10th Parallel marine and aerial routes linking South
America and West Africa harbor a long history of trade
between the two continents. More recently, these routes
have become one of the preferred routes used by Latin
American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine
destined for the growing European market. The Parallel‘s
growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it
known as cocaine ―Highway 10‖ among law enforcement.
Latin American cocaine trafficking organizations,
particularly the Colombian ones, have established stable
bases in West Africa, controlling and developing the route.
West African facilitators, Nigerians as well as an increasing
number of nationals from all countries where shipments are
stocked, have developed a stronger capacity for taking over a
more ambitious and lucrative role in the business as
transporters, partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea),
the West African partner had already started developing his
own trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the
patterns that made Colombia the business model of the drug
industry. In this reshaped context, of particular concern is the
role played by the Colombian FARC (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia) as provider of cocaine
shipments to West African cocaine entrepreneurs, as well as
the impact of drug trafficking money on the financing of
terrorist and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt.

1

INTRODUCTION
In February 2005 the United Nations (UN) Secretary General
in his Report on West Africa presented by his Special
Representative, Amb. Mohammed Ould Abdullhahi
informed the Security Council (SC) and the international
community of a new threat to peace, stability, and
development in West Africa:
The sub-region continues to be confronted by
the phenomenon of violent military
adventurism to seize power. Within the last 12
months, for instance, several West African
countries have had coup attempts: Burkina
Faso,
Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau
and
Mauritania. Moreover, it has emerged that
some members of the security and armed
forces are associated with or otherwise
involved in such illicit activities as smuggling
of arms, drugs and natural resources, human
trafficking, extortion at roadblocks and
money-laundering.1
From that moment on, analysis of the potential impact of the
money and culture of drug trafficking and transnational
organized crime became necessary complements to the work
of international and regional security bodies and think-tanks
involved with West Africa. Attention to the spill-over effects
of drug trafficking in Guinea Bissau 2 was then directed to
Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Sahel-Saharan corridor,
1

ArmsNetAfrica, ―Progress report of the Secretary-General on ways to
combat sub-regional and cross-border problems in West Africa,‖
S/2005/86, 11 February 2005, par. 34, page 9.
2
On 24 October 2007 the UNSC issued a Presidential Statement
expressing deep concern about the threat posed by drug trafficking in
Guinea-Bissau, S/PRST/2007/38. For a complete review of UNSC action
on drug trafficking in West Africa see ―Security Council Report Update‖,
N.1, 4 December 2009, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org.
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leading to a shift in the way the international community
regarded and approached security issues (and intervention) in
this part of the world. The West African case also opened the
way to many similar scenarios elsewhere in Africa and
globally, where the interests of illicit traffickers and
organized crime constitute a considerable obstacle to the
resolution of long-lasting political crises. Thus, the special
session of the Security Council on February 2010, devoted to
the destabilizing impact of transnational organized crime on
fragile states, was the end of an induction phase and the
beginning of a new operational approach to security and
governance-related problems in fragile states and post
conflict countries.
This important progress has not, however, impeded West
African countries in danger of falling into the spiral of
violence (generated by drug trafficking and organized
crime) from experiencing the troubles foreseen in 2005 by
the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for
West Africa. Despite close scrutiny by the international
community (including the UN, the European Union (EU),
and the regional Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), the worst scenarios materialized in the
region. Coups d’état occurred in Guinea Bissau, Guinea,
Mauritania, and Niger, together with the murder of
prominent political figures, mass violence, kidnapping of
foreigners, terrorist attacks in the Sahel-Saharan corridors,
and drug trafficking—particularly cocaine trafficking.
This paper thus looks at the emerging actors and features of
drug (cocaine) trafficking in West Africa. In particular, it
focuses on the consolidation of the West African cocaine
route in terms of both operators and modus operandi. It
then examines the strengthening of tactical relationships
between criminal operators, insurgents, and terrorist groups
along the West African cocaine route. Lastly, it compares
the current West African situation with similar situations
experienced by other drug transit countries and societies.
3

HIGHWAY 10
Just 2575 kilometers separates Dakar and West Africa from
the Brazilian town of Fortaleza along the 10 th Parallel. The
maritime routes through the 10th Parallel were used during
the 15th through19th centuries for moving millions of
enslaved Africans from the Gulf of Guinea to the Americas.
During the Second World War the US Army established an
aerial bridge along the 10th Parallel for flying troops and
equipment to the Mediterranean and North African war
fronts via Dakar and Casablanca. After the war, the aerial
bridge along the 10th parallel remained the shortest and most
effective route from South America to Europe.
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Today the maritime and (increasingly) aerial routes along the
10th Parallel have become one of the preferred routes used by
Latin American traffickers for shipping multi-tons of cocaine
destined for the growing European market. The parallel‘s
growing importance in cocaine trafficking has made it
known as cocaine ―Highway 10‖ among law enforcement.3
Trans-Atlantic trafficking of narcotics emerged at the
beginning of the 1990‘s when Nigerian criminal networks4
started using West Africa as transit and redistribution point
for Asian heroin destined for North American and
European markets. Using the Nigerian diaspora all over the
world and capitalizing on well-developed trade skills,
Nigerian networks, particularly from the southeast and
southwest of the country, specialized in arranging quick
delivery of relatively small quantities (from 0.5 to 25 kilos)
of narcotics in any market of the world on behalf of larger
drug trafficking criminal networks. Well before Colombian
networks, and thanks to a series of local ―competitive
advantages,‖5 Nigerian networks involved in drug
trafficking reinvented and refined the human mules method
to reduce the risk of interception by law enforcement.6 The
skills and capacity of Nigerian criminal networks
3

Liana Sun Wyler and Nicolas Cook, ―Illegal Drug Trade in Africa:
Trends and U.S. Policy,‖ 30 September 2009, CSR Reports, page 12;
Christophe Champin, Afrique Noire poudre blanche l’Afrique sous la
coupe des cartels de la drogue, (Brussels, Belgium: Andre Versailles Ed,
2010), page 78; Mathew Green ―West Africa: Unbroken Line,‖ 4
November 2008, The Financial Times.
http://www.matthewgreenjournalism.com/articles/.
4
Antonio L. Mazzitelli, ―Transnational organized crime in West Africa,‖
International Affairs, (Chatham House), Vol. 83 N.6, November 2007,
page 1084.
5
Among them the large availability of (disposable) human resources, the
relative facility in avoiding controls on arrival and departure at Lagos
airport, the role of Lagos Airport as a major African air transport hub,
and the large Nigerian diaspora.
6
UNODC, ―Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa Situation Report,‖
October 2007, page 11, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/Cocaine-trafficking-Africa-en.pdf.
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(disorganized as well as organized) coupled with their
unique globalized business orientation not only earned
them the nickname of the ―express delivery‖ operators of
the drug industry, but also allowed them to develop
business relations with different partners all over the main
drug producing areas.7
By the mid-1990s, in addition to heroin and home-grown
cannabis, Nigerian networks started trading in cocaine. As
usual, initial trafficking routes used by West African
(mostly Nigerian) networks capitalized on cultural and
language commonalities (a result of a shared colonial
history) to ease the travel of couriers as well as reduce risk
of interception by law enforcement and the likelihood of
seizure and arrest. In the absence of direct flights, cocaine
routes controlled by West African networks moved first to
the Caribbean, where cocaine couriers then boarded flights
to North European air hubs (London and Amsterdam) via
West Africa. These shipments were re-routed from West
Africa to final destinations in Europe, taking advantage of
the reduced attention on passengers on flights originating
from West Africa by European law enforcement airport
check-points. During this period, West African trafficking
operators also started establishing direct contacts with
cocaine providers in South America. These contacts and the
overall ―credibility‖ of West African traffickers were
essential later on when the growing market for cocaine
from Europe would call for the opening up of a West
African cocaine route.
By the end of the 1990s, Colombian trafficking
organizations branched out from US wholesale markets and
started focusing on developing alternative markets,
particularly in Europe. This was based on the establishment
of safe trafficking routes for supplying new markets. Spain
was the natural gate for opening up European markets to
Colombian cocaine entrepreneurs. The worldwide Galician
7

C. Champin, opp. Cit, page 83.
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fishing industry offered Colombian networks ideal partners
for moving multi-ton cocaine shipments through the
Atlantic. Initially, cocaine shipments traveled directly from
Latin America to Spain on fishing trawlers or private
yachts sailing from the Caribbean. The increased attention
of law enforcement on these routes induced trafficking
organizations to look for alternative trafficking methods,
including staging transshipment consignments in the
middle of the Atlantic or close by West African shores and
using commercial containers. In order to run these
important operations, Latin American networks needed
local West African partners responsible for providing
logistical assistance to incoming and outgoing shipments,
ensuring overall impunity and in some cases granting
protection from the predatory attitude of corrupted local
law-enforcement and military agents. Natural partners in
this new business venture were the very Nigerian operators
with whom they had established business relations in
previous years.
Ideal locations for hosting traffickers‘ stockpiling and
redistribution stations were small, stable countries run by
weak institutions and often controlled by corruptible elites.
Additional considerations like geographical proximity to
Nigeria,8 the cultural commonality of the Yoruba
population,9 and the functioning of an important port
served by transatlantic trade routes made Togo the first
location for the new cocaine route. The first large-scale
consignments of cocaine operated jointly by Latino and
European drug trafficking organizations with the assistance
of West African networks probably began in Togo around
the end of the 1990s. This estimation is based on the extent
to which the networks had evolved by the year 2000.
8

Lome (Togo) is just three hours from Lagos, the commercial capital of
Nigeria, by car (with the normal Lagos car traffic).
9
The Yoruba is one of the major ethnic groups of the Gulf of Guinea
stretching from east Nigeria to Benin and Togo. The Yoruba diaspora is
also present in the Caribbean and South America (North of Brazil).
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According to the records of Operation Decollo (take off)
conducted by the Italian General Anti-Mafia Prosecutor
Office,10 from 2000 to 2004 the Calabrian Ndrangheta
families Mancuso and Pesce shipped several hundred kilos
of cocaine from Colombia via Togo to the container port of
Gioia Tauro, South of Italy. The first shipment of some 430
kilos of cocaine from Cartagena (Colombia) via the port of
Lomé (Togo) arrived in Italy in March 2000; the last of 250
kilos in January 2004. In this case, the cocaine was
concealed in containers containing marbles, leather, plastic,
and tuna cans.
These first shipments on containers proved the efficiency of
the new route and validated the development of this
network in terms of location, modus operandi, and
operational capacity. In particular, the strategic location of
West Africa as a midway stockpiling and redistribution
location for the European market—especially emerging
markets in Eastern Europe—and the Middle East, North
Africa, and South Africa offered Latino cocaine trafficking
networks a number of important advantages, all related to
the reduction of the risks involved with the business. First,
it reduced risks linked to the seizure of shipments thanks to
the reduced control on cargo and other commercial
shipments going and coming from West Africa. Second, it
operated a fairer redistribution of risk between exporters
and importers reflected in the sale/purchase prices of
wholesale cocaine in West Africa. Third, it allowed cocaine
operators to quickly adjust supply to the demand of the new
destination markets by narrowing distances and delivery
time between production and destination markets.
This ambitious marketing strategy called for the setting up
of stable and efficient logistical stations in West Africa that
10

―Commissione Parlamentare d‘ inchiesta sul fenomeno della
criminalita organizzata mafiosa o Similar,‖ Relazione annuale sulla
Ndrangheta, doc. XXIII. No 5, XV Legislatura. Rome, Camera dei
Deputati, 18 February 2008, page 22.
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were responsible for stockpiling the product (drugs) and
developing new routes for its arrival and re-routing to
Europe. The first incursion by Latinos guided by Nigerian
networks in Guinea Bissau can be traced back to 2004
when Latinos opened up a fictitious fishing processing
plant in the Bijagos islands. 11 More than likely, this
development was linked to the business contacts of the
corrupted entourage of defunct President Lansana Conte in
Guinea Conakry prior to 2004. Simultaneously, rumors
about large-scale cocaine trafficking via Mauritania
involving figures close to PEPs (political exposed persons)
began in 2005. By mid-2006, Highway 10 was fully
operational as proved by the increasing numbers of cocaine
seizures in Europe facilitated by West African nationals
and the increasing number of interceptions of large cocaine
shipments on the high seas by Spanish, French and UK
Naval Forces.

11

In December 2006 the judicial police of Guinea Bissau raided the said
fish factory seizing arms and money. In the same period reliable security
sources indicated the presence of a well-functioning Latino cocaine
station in the north of Guinea Bissau close by the border with Senegal.

9

Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2010

According to the 2010 Word Drug Report of the UN Office
on Drugs and Crime, some 25 tons of cocaine worth
approximately $6.8 billion (retail price) in European
destination markets were trafficked through West Africa in
2008.12 Despite a slow-down in the volume of shipments in
2009, due to, in part, external political events which
destabilized the cocaine trafficking operational structure,
there are substantive indications that an increase in
trafficking resumed in 2010 with new operators and
methods.
FROM SEA TO AIR
The approach adopted by cocaine traffickers in developing
the new route is a mix of experienced methodologies
12

UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, (NY, NY: United Nations), June
2010, page 242.
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applied in innovative ways. Originally, the maritime
smuggling method was the preferred one. As large
consignments of cocaine were leaving Colombia and
Venezuela by speedboat and loaded offshore on fishing
trawlers sailing to West African waters, shipments were
airdropped at a given location in the Atlantic and collected
there by fishing trawlers. Once close to the West African
coast, shipments were then moved inland by speedboat.
Shipments would generally range from one to four or more
tons. The flags and ownership of the fishing vessels varied,
including West African, European, and South American
naval registrations. Reports from law enforcement
operators also indicate the purchasing and reconditioning of
semi wrecked fishing vessels in West Africa by Latino
operators and their European and African partners for
single-shipment operations. Overall management of
maritime operations, reconditioning of fishing trawlers, and
relations with port and maritime operators were often
assigned to Spanish nationals (Galician in particular)
because of their long experience and presence all over the
Atlantic shores. Crewing was generally made up of Latinos
and West Africans.
The use of disguised shipping containers played an
important role in the development and consolidation of the
West African route as demonstrated by the seizures under
operation Decollo in Cape Verde,13 Senegal, and Nigeria.
The largest ever cocaine seizure in West Africa took place
in 2006 when Nigerian authorities seized a container with
14 tons of cocaine mixed with cement.14 The number of

13

Cape Verde authorities operated two different seizures of cocaine in
containers bound to Portugal in 2008: the first of 508 Kg in a refrigerated
container; the second of 171 Kg in a container of scraped metal. See
―Portuguese, Cape Verdeans sentenced in shipping container drug
trafficking case,‖ Asemana, 22 October 2008,
http://www.asemana.publ.cv/spip.php?article36536.
14
UNODC, ―Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa – The threat to stability
and development (with Special reference to Guinea Bissau),‖ December
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seizures involving shipping containers in West Africa also
indicates the capacity of West African drug trafficking
organizations to diversify sources of supplies and products,
taking full advantage of globalization. In July 2010,
Nigerian authorities reported a cocaine seizure (450
kilograms) in a container originating from Chile.15 In 2006
Senegalese customs seized a container originating in
Pakistan with 8 tons of hashish, probably originating in
West Asia and destined for Europe.16 The opening of
trafficking routes for drugs originating from East Asia is
confirmed by the seizure of a shipment of 130 kilograms of
heroin in a container originating from Iran at the Tin Can
Port of Lagos in November 2010.17
Starting in 2005, repeated evidence points at the increased
use of airplanes for both direct shipment of large cocaine
consignments from South America to West Africa and the
transferring of smaller cocaine shipments within the West
African region. Although undisputed evidence of direct air
routes from South America to West Africa only became
available in 2007, information collected in Guinea and
Guinea Bissau date the opening of the air route back to
2005; and some evidence suggests the air routes opened
even prior to 2005. In April 2005, the Judicial Police of
Guinea Bissau raided a fictitious fish processing facility in
the Bijagos Islands, seizing 18 kilograms of cocaine and a
2007, page 10, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/west_africa_cocaine_report_2007-12_en.pdf.
15
―Nigerian authorities seize 450 kg of cocaine,‖ The Huffington Post, 27
July 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20100727/afnigeria-cocaine-seizure/.
16
Cheikh Tidiane Ndiaye, ―Saisie au port de Dakar de huit tonnes de
haschich d‘une valeur de 24 milliards de FCFA,‖ APS, 30 March 2006,
http://www.aps.sn/spip.php?article17519.
17
National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA), ―NDLEA
intercepts 130kg heroin worth 99 million destined Europe,‖ Press
Release, Nigeria, 26 November 2010,
http://www.ndlea.gov.ng/v1/?q=content/ndlea-intercepts-130kg-heroinworth-99-million-destined-europe-us-nigeria-relations-drug-con.
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large cache of arms. The authorities of Guinea Bissau also
arrested three Spanish, two Venezuelan, and two
Colombian nationals. According to information made
available by Guinea Bissau, the group used a small airplane
to move cocaine shipments from Guinea Bissau via Cap
Skirring (Senegal) to Las Palmas (Spain). The operation
used a small clandestine airport, located near the bogus
facility, to assist in transporting shipments. One year later,
after following reports by national and international media
of clandestine landings and the seizing of a truck loaded
with aviation fuel in the forest close by the border with
Guinea, the Army Chief of Staff of Guinea Bissau, General
Tagme Na Waye, announced the installation of anti-aircraft
artillery in the Bijagos Islands. According to Tagme at the
time, ―Any plane detected in this zone without
authorization will be shot down.‖18
Beginning in 2007, law enforcement authorities from both
sides of the Atlantic started reporting cocaine seizures
directed to West Africa involving the use of airplanes. In
June 2007 2.5 tons of cocaine on a plane destined for Sierra
Leone was seized by Venezuela.19 On 12 July 2008 a Gulf
Streamer jet coming from Venezuela landed at Bissau
International Airport.20 According to a report by the Judicial
Police of Guinea Bissau, military personnel surrounded and
unloaded the plane, which apparently was carrying medical
18

General Tagme Na Waye was killed in a bomb attack on 2 March
2009. See Africa Aviation Forums,
http://www.flyafrica.info/forums/showthread.php?7300-G-Bissau-toshoot-drug-planes.
19
World Security Network, ―Venezuela, Panama seize cocaine
shipments,‖ 15 June 2007,
http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showArticle3.cfm?article_id=145
20&topicID=72.
20
Morice, “Coke en stock (VI): avion oublié, pilote connu, les deux
Guinées,‖ 19 October 2010, http://morice.7duquebec.com/?p=68. Also
see, Tim Gaynor and Tiemoko Diallo, ―Al Qaeda linked to rogue aviation
network,‖ Reuters, 13 January 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60C3E820100113?pageNumber
=3.
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preparations. Because of technical problems, the Gulf
Streamer could not depart and was temporary parked in a
military hangar. The unexpected landing of the jet plane and
the active involvement of military personnel in unloading
and shading the plane attracted the attention of the Judicial
Police of Guinea Bissau, which requested an investigation.
In the following days, the police arrested three policemen
and two air traffic-control agents, as well as the Latino crew
of the plane. Among the crew was Mr. Carmelo Vasquez
Guerra, a Mexican who was investigated by Mexican Police
for piloting a DC-9 jet loaded with 5 tons of cocaine in 2006.
On 17 July an inspection team flown into Guinea Bissau by
INTERPOL was permitted to search the plane. The
inspection team did not find any cocaine onboard; however,
drug-sniffing dogs did find cocaine on the plane, and the
black box also confirmed suspicions about the actual mission
of the plane. The same Gulf Streamer plane, purchased in the
US a few months before, was under watch by the DEA
because of its likely use in drug trafficking operations.
Although evidence was mounting, all arrested Latinos had
fled the country due to the ―good services‖ provided by a
very influential legal attorney.
The use of jet airplanes for transatlantic operations reached
its peak in November 2009, when the wreckage of a burned
Boeing 727 was discovered in the middle of the Sahel desert
in the Gao region of Mali. According to investigators, the
Boeing was registered in Guinea Bissau and belonged to a
company called Africa Air. It took off from Panama on 16
October en route to Mali. After a refueling stop in
Maracaibo, Venezuela, the airplane disappeared from the
radar screens of Venezuelan authorities, reappearing close to
the border with Colombia. A few hours later the Venezuelan
air control authorities located the plane over the Isla
Margaritas, flying toward Africa. Despite the alert by
Venezuelan authorities to all West African and international
counterparts, no information about the plane was available
until 16 November when the Office for West Africa of the
United Nations Office for Drug and Crime (UNODC)
14

announced the discovery of the wreckages of the Boeing 727
some 200 km north of Gao, Mali. According to investigators,
the plane landed on an improvised sand landing strip. After
the cocaine shipment, ranging from 2.5 to 9 tons, was loaded
onto a convoy of 4WD vehicles, the plane was torched.21
The case of the Boeing 727 does not appear to be unique.
According to local sources,22 several large cocaine air
shipments had already used the Sahel-Saharan landing
facilities, taking advantage of well-established trans-Saharan
smuggling routes and the presence of rebels and terrorist
groups operating all through the Sahel-Saharan belt
(Mauritania, the Northern regions of Mali, Niger, and Chad).
23

Smaller airplanes were used in the region for breaking down,
redistributing, and re-routing large cocaine shipments into
smaller consignments (up to 900 kilograms). In May 2007
Mauritanian authorities seized 629 kg of cocaine abandoned
on the tarmac of the Nouadhibou Airport by a small Cessna
441 turbo propeller airplane that originated out of Venezuela
and was later recovered in the desert some 125 km from the
airport.24 Subsequent investigations led to the seizure of an
additional 860 kg of cocaine in Nouakchott,25 and resulted in
the seizure of one additional airplane, one helicopter, and the
21

Serge Daniel, “Burnout Boeing, a clue in African drugs trade,‖ AFP,
11 December 2009,
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5i6wdoyjewoRGhOaaAHVYfrVWONQ.
22
Salima Tlemçani, ―Au Sahel, narcotrafiquants et terroristes se
partagent le terrain”, El Watan, 1 November 2010,
http://www.elwatan.com/actualite/au-sahel-narcotrafiquants-etterroristes-se-partagent-le-terrain-01-11-2010-97159_109.php.
23
Morice, ―Coke en stock (IV) Boeing, Touaregs… et espions !,‖ 16
October 2010, http://morice.7duquebec.com/?p=55.
24
INTERPOL, ―INTERPOL issues Red Notice for suspected drug
trafficker,‖ 20 June 2007,
http://www.interpol.int/public/icpo/pressreleases/pr2007/pr200724.asp.
25
Ibrahima Sylla, ―Mauritania seizes 860kg cocaine in biggest seizure,‖
Reuters, 14 August 2007,
http://in.reuters.com/article/2007/08/14/idINIndia-28978520070814.
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indictment of twelve people including two French nationals,
two Belgians, one Moroccan, and seven Mauritanians.
Among the indicted Mauritanians was Sidi Mohamed Ould
Haidalla, son of former Mauritanian President Mohamed
Khouna Ould Haidalla.26 Reliable local sources involved in
the investigation of the case indicated that the cocaine most
likely had previously arrived by sea, had been stocked in a
villa rented by the Mauritanian trafficking group just nearby
the Nouadihbou landing strip, and had been ready on the
tarmac for loading onto the small Cessna plane for inward
dispatching to either Morocco or some location on the SahelSaharan belt. Another example of the use of small planes in
trafficking occurred in June 2007. A small hydroplane had
taken off somewhere in the Sahara desert, close to
Mauritania and the Western Sahara. Subsequently, the
emergency landing of this small hydroplane on a private
airport in the southern part of Gran Canary Island led to a
preliminary seizure of a bag with 25 kg of cocaine.27 An
additional 800 kg of cocaine were then recovered by the
Spanish Navy in the territorial waters of the Canary Islands,
following the information given by the arrested Uruguayan
pilot.
The most representative case of the use of small turbo
propeller airplanes for regional transhipment of cocaine
occurred in Sierra Leone on 13 July 2008. On this occasion,
Sierra Leone authorities seized over 600 kg of cocaine in a
twin turbo propeller airplane abandoned on the tarmac of the

26

Morice, “Coke en stock (VII): en Mauritanie, même avion, même
procédé,‖ 22 October 2010,
http://www.centpapiers.com/coke-en-stock-vii-en-mauritanie-memeavion-meme-procede/42672.
27
Erena Calvo, ―Hallan 800 kilos de cocaína tras el amerizaje forzoso de
un hidroavión,‖ ABC España, 21 June 2007,
http://www.abc.es/hemeroteca/historico-21-062007/abc/Nacional/hallan-800-kilos-de-cocaina-tras-el-amerizajeforzoso-de-un-hidroavion_1633827367526.html.
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Freetown Lungi International Airport.28
After an
unauthorized landing, the crew of the plane abandoned the
plane, cocaine, AK 47 and AK 48 rifles, and ammunition.
The airplane bore false Red Cross logos 29 on the tail and was
equipped with additional tanks for extended flying range.
Sierra Leone Police eventually arrested eleven foreign
nationals including a Colombian, six Venezuelans, one US
national, a Nigerian, a national from Guinea Bissau, and a
number of Sierra Leoneans, including police officers and one
airport control officer. Among the arrested Sierra Leoneans
was the brother of the Minister of Transport, who tendered
his resignation a few days later. According to Michael
Schulenburg, Head of the United Nations Mission in Sierra
Leone, ―there must be many more flights like this.‖ 30 In
previous years, informants from both Guinea Bissau and
Guinea Conakry had reported the landing and taking off of
small planes bearing UN and Red Cross logos. Incidentally,
the seizure in Sierra Leone occurred just one day after the
landing in Bissau of the Gulf Streamer jet from Venezuela.31
More mysterious is how West African cocaine shipments
reach European markets. Seizures in Europe prove only the
continued use of human couriers, which cannot be
accountable for the more than the 25-30 tons of narcotics
28

―Sierra Leone police seize drugs plane,‖ BBC World News, 14 July
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7504953.stm.
29
The use of fake Red Cross and UN logos on small drug trafficking
airplanes seems to be quite common. On 10 August 2010 Panamanian
authorities seized a small Cessna 206 plane with UNICEF and Red Cross
logos in the province of Santa Ana, Los Santos. According to the
investigation, the plane was used for moving drug (heroin, cocaine, and
methamphetamine) shipments. See Zenaida Valdés, ―Avioneta
trasportaba drogas: hay tres detenidos,” Critica en Línea, 25 August
2010,
http://www.critica.com.pa/archivo/08252010/suc17.html#axzz19cSeM8q
K.
30
―Cocaine bust: 3 more arrested,‖ AFP, 17 July 2008,
http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Cocaine-bust-3-more-arrested20080717.
31
See page 10.
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that the UNODC estimated as likely transiting annually via
West Africa.32 If part of the cocaine stocked in West Africa
is re-exported via the maritime channel (via fishing vessels
and containers, as proved by the seizures of containers in
Cape Verde in 2008),33 analysts nowadays are inclined to
assign a more prominent role to the rerouting of large
shipments (up to 7 tons) via the Sahel-Saharan corridor.
Unloaded from planes as large as the Malian 727-200 or as
small as the Mauritanian Cessna, shipments are loaded onto
convoys of 4WD vehicles which, with the help of Tourag
guides and the logistical assistance of terrorist and guerrilla
groups operating in the region, cross the Sahel-Saharan belt
both from South to North (towards the Mediterranean shores
of Algeria, Morocco, and Libya), and from West to East (via
the trans-Saharan routes crossing the northern parts of Mali,
Niger, Chad, Sudan, and Egypt). Once at Northern Africa
Mediterranean shores, cocaine shipments are transferred to
European destinations via speedboats equipped with up to
2000 HP engines and supplementary tanks able to reach
Spain and Italian shores,34 or are re-embarked on maritime
cargo ships heading toward European ports. According to
analysts, likely destinations for North African re-embarked
cocaine shipments could be the ports of Balkan and south
Eastern European countries.35
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2010.
33
See footnote 18 above.
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Christophe Champin, op. cit. page 117.
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FOREIGNERS BUT INCREASINGLY MORE AFRICANS
As mentioned above, Nigerian criminal entrepreneurs were
the first to open up West Africa to the drug trafficking
business. Since then, drug trafficking operators in the
region have grown considerably, both in term of origin
(West African, South American, and European) and
capacities (facilitators, transporters, partners, and
producers). Based on arrests and investigations carried out
in Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Togo, Ghana, and Senegal, Latin
American cocaine trafficking organizations, particularly
Colombian organizations, have established stable bases in
the region, controlling and developing the route. West
African facilitators, Nigerian but also and increasingly
nationals from all countries where shipments are stocked,
have developed a stronger capacity for taking over a more
ambitious and lucrative role in the business as transporters,
partners, and final buyers. In one case (Guinea), the West
African partner had already started developing his own
trafficking and manufacturing capacity, reproducing the
patterns that made Colombia the business model of the
drug industry. In this reshaped context, of particular
concern is the role played by the Colombian FARC
(Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) as
provider of cocaine shipments to West African cocaine
entrepreneurs, as well as the impact of drug trafficking
money on the financing of terrorist and rebel groups
operating in the Sahel-Saharan belt.
FROM FACILITATORS TO PRODUCERS
On 7 July 2007, The Economist published a short article on
Guinea Bissau titled, ―Pushers‘ Paradise—the Drugs Trade
in the Continent‘s First Narco-state is Booming.‖ 36 The
article, the first by a leading international magazine,
36

―Pushers' paradise: The drugs trade in the continent's first narco-state is
booming,‖ 7 June 2007, The Economist,
http://www.economist.com/node/9304402.
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analyzed the implications of cocaine trafficking on fragile
state like Guinea Bissau. Almost two years later, Marco
Vernaschi was awarded first prize in the Photographers
Giving Back Photo Award for a photo showing the bloodstained steel chair on which the President of Guinea-Bissau,
João Bernardo Viera, was executed.37 From Bissau, Mr.
Vernaschi also published a series of articles, one of which
was titled, ―Guinea Bissau: A Gangster's Paradise,‖38 where
he describes his direct experience with Augusto Bliri, a
―young but talented drug lord who is legend in Bissau.‖ The
story of Bliri is probably not different from the many other
foot soldiers of the drug industry in Mexico, Colombia, or
Albania, and represents the danger to which countries like
Guinea Bissau are exposed. Augusto started his career as
drug trafficker by buying back recovered cocaine bricks
from Guinea Bissau fishermen and reselling them to Latinos
and international traffickers. The money generated from this
allowed Augusto to move ahead in the trafficking chain and
become a visible reference for young Guinea Bissau
traffickers. The article describes, in simple but frank terms,
the likely trajectory of West African cocaine traffickers from
―pushers‖ to ―gangsters.‖ The history of Augusto Bliri, the
Guinea Bissau pusher-turned-cocaine-kingpin, describes
only the most obvious part of the story and does not identify
the real operators and masterminds of the West African
cocaine trade. Much more representative are the stories of
Sidi Mohamed Ould Haidalla,39 son of former of
Mauritanian President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, and
Ousmane Conte, the eldest son of the President of Guinea
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Natalie Applewhite, ―Marco Vernaschi wins top Prize in PBC Award
Contest,‖ 4 March, 2010,
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See footnote 23 and related text.
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Lansana Conte,40 and Rear Admiral Jose Americo Bubo Na
Tchuto, openly accused by the US as being a major drug
kingpin.41 Each of them could be considered a different but
complementary model of the new West African drug
trafficking industry in the realms of transportation,
partnerships, entrepreneurship, and facilitation. Their stories
mirror (to a certain extent) the success stories of Mexican
and Colombian drug entrepreneurs who were able to create
viable narco-trafficking industries from controlling and
developing a trafficking route.
Probably the most interesting profile among the individuals
mentioned above is that of Ousmane Conte, arrested together
with his brother Aususmane and his brother-in-law Saturnin
Bangoura shortly after the coup that followed the death of
President Lansana Conte of Guinea on December 2008.
Released on bail in July 2010, Ousmane Conte confessed on
Guinean TV his involvement in drug trafficking. Beside
cocaine trafficking, Ousmane Conte was suspected of being
involved in the smuggling of migrants, as well as carrying
out indiscriminate violence resulting in the deaths of some
129 civilians during riots that occurred in Conakry at the
beginning of 2007 (while he was Captain of the Red Berets
40

Ousamene Conte was arrested by the Guinea military junta
immediately after the death of his father and confessed on TV his
involvement in drug trafficking. He was recently released. On 1 June
2010 the US designated him as ―drug kingpin‖ and as such imposed
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News, 14 March 2009,
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41
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multi-hundred kilogram shipment of cocaine from Venezuela to GuineaBissau on July 12, 2008. Na Tchuto has long been suspected of being a
major facilitator of narcotics trafficking in Guinea-Bissau,‖ Press Room,
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(Presidential Guard)).42 In addition to multiple criminal
activities, Ousamane Conte is strongly linked to the
attempted upgrading of Guinea Conakry from the simple role
of a stockpiling and redistribution location to one of a
producer of cocaine and methamphetamine.
On 15 July 2009, the authorities of Guinea raided a
suspected drug processing facility, seizing equipment and
toxic chemical substances. Reports about drug processing
facilities in Guinea had been circulating among the
intelligence community since 2007, as well as rumors about
the attempt of introducing opium poppy cultivation in the
highlands of Guinea. A later UNODC- INTERPOL mission
visited the eight seized facilities located in Conakry and in
the nearby native village of former President Lousana Conte,
some 100 kilometers north of Conakry. The UNODC INTERPOL mission confirmed that the equipment and the
chemical substances seized43 enabled the processing of
cocaine and heroin and the production of methamphetamine
and MDMA (ecstasy).44
Ousmane Conte and Sidi Mohamed Ould Haidalla shared
one common feature: their closeness to power, which gave
drug traffickers and any other criminal elements the benefit
of a considerable reduction of the risks45 connected with the
42

Human Rights Watch, ―Guinea: Free Rein to Security Forces Fuels
Violence -Government Should Create Independent Body to Investigate,
Prosecute Abuses,‖ 24 April 2007,
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drug business. Moreover, the benefits and corruptive power
of criminal activity do not know gender boundaries, as
proved by the case of Ms. Zainab Conte, a wife of former
President of Guinea Lousana Conte. She was arrested whilst
attempting to cross the Sierra Leone border with hundreds of
thousands US dollars and Euros and some gold bars.
According to a leaked cable from the US Embassy in
Freetown:
A presidential advisor reported that, though
border officials detained Zainab and a convoy
of three luxury vehicles, they waved other
vehicles through, not realizing one contained
the long-sought after Gibrilla Kamara (aka
GK). Kamara is a prime suspect in the July
13 cocaine bust, and the only “big fish”
remaining outside the net of the Sierra Leone
Police. Thought to be one of the drug
trafficking ring’s key facilitators, rumours
abounded that he had fled to Guinea shortly
after the bust. It now appears that Kamara
remained in Sierra Leone with the currency
and other valuables, with the intention of
crossing the border under the protection of
Zainab.46
Ms. Conte and her convoy of three luxury 4WD vehicles
were later released following a telephone call from President
Conte of Guinea to President Koroma of Sierra Leone.
According to other sources, the intent of Ms. Conte‘s travel
to Sierra Leone was buying back the cocaine seized one
month before at Lungi International Airport. Mastermind and
financial promoter of the operation was Ousamane Conte,
probably the owner of the seized shipment.
46

Festus Lahai, ―Ernest Koroma Aides Escape of Drug Lord,‖ The New
People Newspaper Online,
http://www.thenewpeople.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=ar
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The need for reducing risk by enlisting into the business
young but influential West African personalities is further
proved by the DEA‘s ―Operation Relentless,‖ 47 which
contributed to the dismantling of an international network
led by a Colombian trafficker and involving Nigerians and a
Russian pilot (July 2010). In this case the defendants were
accused (and eventually convicted) of trying to smuggle
several tons of cocaine from Colombia and Venezuela to
West Africa, and subsequently to the US. According to wiretaped conversations, the network had access to a private
airfield in Guinea, and was considering buying its own
airport in order to arrange direct deliveries from Bolivia to
West Africa. The group also planned to set up
methamphetamine production in Liberia. In order to operate,
the network tried to enlist the Director and Deputy Director
of the Liberian Security Agency, both of who were working
as undercover agents for the DEA. Incidentally, the Director
of the National Security Agency of Liberia, Mr. Fombah Teh
Sirleaf, is also the son of the President of Liberia 48.
FOREIGN PROVIDERS, REBELS AND TERRORIST
GROUPS
The development and growth of West African trafficking
routes could have not happened without the participation and
the in loco presence of European, South American (mostly
Colombian), and North African traffickers. As mentioned
above, the Italian Ndrangheta set up operations via Togo in
2004: the Pesce and Mancuso clans are said to be present in
Togo from where they supposedly traffick cocaine to
47

U. S. Attorney Southern District of New York, ―Manhattan U.S,
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Europe.49 The Ndrangheta operational presence in West
Africa was confirmed in 2007 when the Italian Guardia di
Finanza seized 250 kg of Bolivian cocaine in Milan
belonging to the Ndrangheta clan Morabito-BruzzanitiPalamara.50 The shipment was hidden in a camper originally
from Brazil but re-shipped to Italy from Dakar. Sicilian
mafias also showed their presence in West Africa. In 2005
the Italian security services picked up the Sicilian mafia boss
Giovanni Bonomo on the tarmac of the Dakar international
airport.51 Coming from Abidjan, Mr. Bonomo was regularly
visiting Dakar where he apparently had a stake in gambling
and tourism businesses. In Italy, Mr. Bonomo was the boss
of the Partinico ―mandamento,‖ a village in the outskirts of
Palermo.
The networks established by the Italian Mafiosi preceded the
arrival and installation of Latinos, principally Colombian and
Venezuelan, in the region. Controllers of the supply from the
other side of the Atlantic, Colombians and their Venezuelan
partners, are nowadays the most prominent operators in the
region. According to the DEA, at least nine top-tier South
American and Mexican drug trafficking organizations
(DTOs) have established operations in Africa since 2007.52
The ideological differences that, in the past, could be drawn
between representatives of Colombian DTOs and Colombian
guerrilla organizations (particularly the FARC) seem
49
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nowadays blurred when looking at the development of the
Colombian presence in West Africa. Based on arrests and
intelligence reports, both are well established in the region.
In November 2008, the Togolese police, with the assistance
of the DEA, dismantled in Lomé, Togo, an international
cocaine trafficking network made up of nationals from
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, South Africa, Ghana, and
Togo.53 According to a report, the group was planning to fly
cocaine from South America to a landing strip in the
northern part of the country. Once in Togo, cocaine
shipments would be moved to the port of Lomé and rerouted
to European destinations via containers. Some members of
the group had entered the country a few months before with
diplomatic passports issued in Guinea. One of the arrested
persons was Jorge Solano Cortes, a well-known partner of
the Rodriguez brothers in the Cali Cartel, who had started his
cocaine trafficking career as a deputy of Harold Ackerman in
the early 1990s.54
Beginning in 2006, intelligence reports alerted the
international community of the interest of the FARC in
developing the West African route. In August 2007 GuineaBissau's police announced the arrest of two Colombians after
seizing weapons and a large sum of money in a raid on a
suspected location in the Bairro Militar of Bissau.55 During
the raid police also seized documents relating the two
Colombians to the highest levels of Guinea Bissau‘s
institutional and political powers. One of the two arrested
was identified as Juan Pablo Rubio Camacho, already
convicted in the US for cocaine trafficking in 1988. In 2001
53
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Colombian police arrested Juan Pablo Camacho and accused
him as being one of the organizers of the money laundering
machinery of the FARC. According to reports made
available at the moment of the arrest, Juan Pablo Camacho
owned properties worth some $50 million in Panama.56 The
FARC also appears as a direct promoter of the West African
route by providing regular cocaine shipments to West Africa.
In the indictment submitted by the Manhattan US Attorney
against Marcel Acevedo Sarmiento in the case following the
DEA‘s ―Relentless Operation,‖57 Ms. Daria Lupacchino,
DEA Special Agent involved in the case, related that two of
the defendants not only confirmed FARC ownership of
cocaine to be shipped to Liberia but also the FARC‘s
readiness to send regular cocaine supplies to West Africa.
A further serious concern of the West African drug
trafficking scenario is represented by the growing relevance
of cocaine money in the financing of rebel and terrorist
groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan corridors.58 Collected
evidence (seizures and arrests) allows for the connection of
direct links between rebel and terrorist groups operating in
the region to cocaine trafficking. With the exception of a
56
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recent case presented by the DEA at the US Southern
District Court of New York, 59 these links are more the result
of situational awareness on the ground and reports from the
media60 rather than data from investigations and
prosecutions. Indeed, providing logistical assistance to
trafficking operations and charging security fees for ensuring
free and safe passage of illicit shipments is certainly an easy
source of fresh cash for those involved in the trade and for
those traffickers who are able to operate in uncontrolled
territories.61
Running from the shores of the Atlantic to the Mediterranean
Sea, the Sahel-Saharan route has always served as main
trading and communication route for the nomadic migrations
of Tuareg communities living in Mauritania, Northern Mali,
59
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Niger, and Chad. The almost total absence of a state
presence and state control over this huge territory and the
independent nature of Tuareg communities, in tandem with
an increased presence of bandits and rebel and terrorist
groups, have resulted in an ideal environment for the
development of a smuggling-based economy. Besides
contraband of licit items and the smuggling of small arms,
the Sahel-Saharan corridor became one of the preferred
routes for cigarette smuggling in the early 1990‘s. Known in
Algeria as the ―Marlboro Connection,‖ cigarette smuggling
prospered due to the complacent attitude of local border
authorities. By early 2000, the same route started to be used
for trafficking of arms, migrants, and hashish. From April
2006 to April 2007, Niger authorities reported the seizure of
5.7 tons of hashish in five different operations carried out in
the Northern part of the country. 62 In the same period, the
Mouvement des Nigeriens pour la Justice (MNJ), a Tuareg
rebel group operating mostly in the Northern part of Niger,
also announced the seizure of a large consignment of
narcotics,63 probably hashish, which was first offered to
authorities in the region for destruction and later sold to
North African buyers. Also, in December 2007 the
international media reported the seizure of 750 kg of cocaine
by Malian customs following a shootout with a caravan of
highly armed traffickers 150 km north of Kidal. 64 Two
months later, Malian authorities officially announced that the
drug seized was hashish and not cocaine. Incidentally, Mr.
Sidi Mohammed Ould Haidallah, the mastermind of the
Mauritanian cocaine trafficking network,65 was arrested in
62
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Morocco in 2008 where he was residing with a Malian
passport released in Gao, a key location on the SahelSaharan route. Final confirmation of the importance and
upgrading of the route for cocaine trafficking is given by the
story of the Boeing 727 landed in Mali in 2009.
The destructive and corruptive effects of drug trafficking
money in the Sahel-Saharan region on genuine political
claims and struggles is further evidenced by the recent arrest
in Mali on drug trafficking charges of six alleged members
of the Front Polisario,66 a separatist movement fighting for
decades to get independence for the Western Sahara . One of
the arrested, Sultan Ould Bady, seems also to be involved in
the kidnapping and subsequent sales of European hostages in
the Sahara before joining the ranks of AQIM (al-Qaeda in
the Maghreb). In August 2010, Mauritanian authorities
―deported‖ to Mali a well-known Sahwari, Omar Ahmed
Ould Sidi Ould Hama (aka Omar Sahraoui), sentenced to life
imprisonment in Mauritania for masterminding the AQIM
kidnapping of three Spanish aid workers in 2009. According
to reports, the ―deportation‖ of Omar Sahraoui was part of a
deal allowing the release of two Spanish nationals kidnapped
by AQIM.67 Front Polisario had openly denounced the risk
of infiltration of AQIM in its ranks and in the very
impoverished Sahrawi‘s camps located at the border of
Western Sahara.
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WEST AFRICAN STYLE
The above-described situation, despite a more convoluted
scenario in terms of actors, operational capacities, and modus
operandi, calls for a tentative comparative analysis with
similar situations experienced by other regions and countries.
Building upon proved successes and failures might assist
West Africa in mitigating the worst effects of the lure of a
booming drug trafficking industry. The emerging West
African drug industry, however, contains some nuances, and
cannot be entirely analyzed based on Colombian and
Mexican drug trafficking experiences. Indeed, Colombia and
Mexico have built their drug industries on pre-existent
cultivation and subsequent exporting/smuggling networks. In
the case of Colombia, the cocaine boom was built on the
marijuana industry and the so-called “marimberos‖ of the
Caribbean coast.68 In the case of Mexico, cocaine trafficking
took advantage of the already existent networks developed
by Mexican drug trafficking organizations that specialized in
marijuana and heroin (black tar) production by generations
of ―gomeros‖ localized in the Sonora state.69 The proximity
to the largest consumer market for illicit drugs, however,
clearly added value and opportunities to the Mexican drug
trafficking industry. Differences also exist in terms of the
main actors involved. Whilst in West Africa, main drug
trafficking actors appeared to be linked to elites; in Mexico
and Colombia, prominent figures in drug trafficking come
from popular origins and had to build up their careers on
their specific (criminal) competences rather than pre-existent
wealth and ability in corrupting and infiltrating state
institutions. In other words, as in Colombia and Mexico,
drug trafficking mirrored the overall social and economic
transition of national societies towards liberal markets and
68
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democratic rule. In West Africa drug trafficking has mostly
benefited, directly or indirectly, the same elites who
monopolize economic opportunities arising from the
participation of West African economies in global markets.70
As to the participation and increased role of terrorist and
guerrilla groups, the Colombian and West African situations
also vary. In Colombia, FARC and paramilitary groups
benefited from control of production. Hence, their direct
involvement in trafficking came at a second stage and as a
natural consequence of control over raw materials and their
related markets. In the Sahel-Saharan corridors terrorist and
rebel groups capitalize on their logistical and territorial
control capacities, offering drug traffickers services in
exchange for money (and perhaps arms). The West African
situation also radically diverges from the one characterized
by the presence of structured Mafia-type criminal
organizations, the aim of which is ―controlling the supply of
protection‖71 to any actor operating in their territories, often
in competition with state institutions. From this perspective,
the very nature of West African drug trafficking syndicates,
modeled on the loose business-oriented Nigerian model,
represents per se a new challenging and successful model of
an organized criminal network. Hence, there is no value in
comparing the West African drug trafficking situation to the
ones prevalent in scenarios characterized by the operation of
the Italian and Russian mafias, the Japanese yakuza, or the
Chinese triads.
The scenarios which can be compared with the West African
one are those offered by some Central American countries
70
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(Guatemala and Honduras) and the Caribbean (Jamaica, in
particular). As in West Africa, in Honduras and Guatemala
foreign drug trafficking organizations (Colombian and
Mexican) seem to have established an operational basis for
stockpiling large cocaine shipments destined for North
American markets, infiltrated state institutions, and have
developed business alliances with members of economic and
political establishments. In December 2010, President
Alvaro Colón of Guatemala declared a state of emergency in
a province bordering Mexico because of the presence and
operation of the (Mexican) Zetas drug trafficking
organization.72 In Honduras, the Chief of the Anti-Narcotics
Squad was murdered just after he publicly denounced the
complicity of land-owners in the landing and subsequent
unloading of cocaine in airplanes in December 2009.73
Different from West Africa, Honduras and Guatemala also
present a complex internal criminal panorama featuring the
presence and territorial challenge to state institutions by
maras, juvenile criminal gangs operating in Mexico and the
US. The scenario and experience of Jamaica in the cocaine
flows of the 1980‘s provides an example of what West
Africa may experience as a consequence of the growth of
small cocaine trafficking gangs like the one led by Augusto
Bliri in Guinea Bissau. The recent case of the extradition
from Jamaica to the US of drug kingpin Christopher
―Dudus‖ Coke provides a clear example of the costs of
letting native drug traffickers prosper.74 Common and
72
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certainly threatening features of both the Central American
and the Caribbean scenarios are the very high murder rates,
among the highest in the world,75 and the linkages to the
effects of drug (cocaine) trafficking. Violence in these two
scenarios mirrors two complementary phases of the
destabilizing effects of drug trafficking. In Central America,
violence is mostly instrumental to affirming control of
trafficking routes. In the Caribbean (particularly in Jamaica),
violence is the result of turf wars among criminal groups
caused by the drying up of drug-derived revenues. Luckily,
drug trafficking-originated violence is still minimal in West
Africa, but previous well documented experiences of civil
conflicts caused by the fight over control for important
sources of revenues (oil, diamonds, etc.) ought to serve as a
clear indicator of the risks.
CONCLUSIONS
Far from losing its relevance, the West African routes and
the increasingly complex network of operators involved are a
serious threat to the stability and balanced development of
the region. Stronger in terms of operational capacity and
global networking, West African operators, whether criminal
entrepreneurs from the Atlantic coast or members of terrorist
and rebel groups operating in the Sahel-Saharan corridor, are
gradually climbing the ladders of the drug and criminal
industries. Their rise will extract a heavy price on West
African societies and institutions, slowing down, if not
hijacking, the pace of social and economic development.
Countries and institutions unable to evade and/or counter the
corruptive power and lure of the culture of drug money will
army operatives and gangs. ―Profile: Christopher ‗Dudus‘ Coke,‖ BBC
News, 23 June 2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10146172.
75
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245. Also see ―Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and
Policy Options in the Caribbean,‖ Report No. 37820, (A Joint Report by
the UNODC and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region of the
World Bank), March 2007.
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pay the heaviest price. Conscious of the risks, governments
in the region, their partners, and the international community
have devised plans and operational mechanisms 76 which, if
properly and promptly implemented, ought to provide
effective responses to this threatening menace. Yet, as
cautioned by former Minister of Justice of Guinea Bissau,
Ms. Carmelita Pires, the current Special Advisor to the
President of the ECOWAS Commission, political will and
robust partnership between the sub-region and the
international community will be crucial in order to end ―the
culture of impunity.‖ 77 Indeed, focusing on drug trafficking
should not divert attention from the core problems of the
West African situation: corruption, impunity, and the
progressive erosion of a culture of respect for legality and
state institutions.
West Africa could, in this respect, learn from the experiences
of Guatemala (and it‘s International Commission Against
Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG)). Restoring confidence in
justice and in national institutions—breaking the circle of
impunity, particularly when impunity is a peculiar feature of
political and economic power—is indispensable to the inputs
of technical cooperation the international community may be
ready to provide. Undoubtedly, any West African-CICIG
experience should maximize the strengthening of the
capacity of national institutions, be less ―intrusive‖ as
possible, and focus on the capacity-building of reliable teams
of investigators, prosecutors, and judges accountable to the
highest authorities of the state and civic society. In this
respect, external independent commissions should then
76
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77
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periodically verify progress in the fight against impunity and
publicly report about them to both national stakeholders
(including civic society) and the international community.
Also, international partners of West African countries ought
to take a clear stand against those PEPs suspected of
involvement in criminal affairs. The examples given by the
US with respect to the cases of Guinea and Guinea Bissau set
a clear standard and silence those voices which are ready to
offer impunity to native drug and war lords in exchange for
an uncertain renunciation of the use of violence in postconflict scenarios. Investing in justice, legality, and good
governance may sound like a long term utopian investment,78
but it is the only way to nurture a culture of the rule of law
and of state which can eventually minimize the impact of
drug
and
other
criminal
organizations.
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